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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant's Statement of Facts recites the facts.
which plaintiff wished the jury to believe. For that
reason, and inasmuch as the facts most favorable to Defendant should be recited, we prefer to state those facts.
The parties will be referred to as they appeared at trial.
The accident occurred on a straight stretch of road,
black top surfaced, two lanes divided by a center stripe,
dividing east and west bound traffic. The speed limit
posted was 40 mph, and passing was permitted. (T-79)
Brian Murray testified that he was driving east, with
no traffic ahead or behind him ( T-99) ; saw Plaintiff's
car parked off the right side of the road with its right
1

turn signal flashing, but with its left wheels on the e<lg(l
of the travel portion, when he was about 600 feet away
(T-87-88); he did not know whose car it was (T-87); when
his car was about 150-200 feet away, that car started moving into the highway (T-88); he· sounded his horn twicP
and moved into the passing lane as the car ahead, having
just started up, "\\""as moving slowly-about 5 to 10 miles
per hour ( T-96) ; the car ahead gave no signal as it proceeded ahead and Defendant was overtaking it in the
passing lane (T-88-89-131); but when the front of the
Defendant's car was near the rear of Plaintiff's car,
Brian saw one flash of the left blinker, immediately
followed by the start of a left turn by Plaintiff (T-89)
and the impact occurred.
The Chief of Police of Mapleton, Bryant Kent
Whe·eler, investigated the accident and established the
position of the vehicles after the accident (T-74-75);
point of impact (T-82-83) and other physical facts he
found at the scene immediately following the accident
(T-75).
Muriel Diamond, Plaintiff's witness, testified she
saw the accident, but saw no turn signal on Plaintiff's
car (T-26).
After the accident, in a conversation overheard by
Brian Murray in Plaintiff's home where several neighbors had congregated, Plaintiff stated she had not seen
Defendant's truck before she started her left turn, at
which time she saw it out of the corner of her eye, and
"they must have been going a hundred miles an hour"
2

(T-136). Her car was equipped with an outside rear view
mirror.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN SUSTAINING DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION
TO WITNESS BRYANT HANSEN'S TESTIMONY
CONCERNING THE POINT OF IMPACT.

The accident occurred on December 31, 1969, and
Mr. Hansen first visited the scene on or about May 1,
1970 (T-13). He had not personally seen vehicles in their
final position after the accident, the skid marks, or other
physical factors which were present immediately following the accident.
Plaintiff's efforts to have Mr. Hansen establish the
point of impact was based on what he had been told
was the position of the vehicles after the accident, and
then applying this formula (T-144):
"If two vehicles are of identicial weight and
identical speed approaching at a 90 degree angle
the resultant will be exactly half of that 90 degree
angle, or a 45 degree angle. Thus they will continue at an angle of 45 degrees from the direction
of either on approaching that point. So using this
we move backwards from the point of impact after
we know the momentum of the vehicles. We work
backwards from the point of rest after we know
the momentum."

On voir dire examination, the witness stated (T-145):
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"Q.

Suppose that one of the drivers is turning
the wheel one way or other immediately upon
or after the impact. Doesn't that have something to do with your calculations?

A.

Very little to do. It's like turning the wheel
on ice or snow. The force overcomes the traction.

Q.

In other words, if you turn the wheel of the
car after an impact, it doesn't change the direction of the car at all?

A.

That isn't what I said, sir,

Q.

Then doesn't it have a great deal to do with
where they come to rest? Whether the drivers
through reaction or otherwise turn their
wheels one way or another?

A.

This can have an influence, yes."

There were many other facts missing, by the witness'
own testimony-e.g., the weight of the vehicles, the exact
speed of each, the angle of the two vehicles at impact, etc.
The Defendant's objections to his conclusion on the
basis of no proper foundation was properly upheld by
the Court.
We need only look at Appelant's citations under her
Point One as authority for upholding the Honorable: Trial
Court's ruling.
In 66 ALR 2d 1048, Section 9 at Page 1069, the
annotator cites many cases where "traffic experts" who
were not at the scene, may not testify concerning the
point of impact, based on photographs, position of vehi4

cles after accident, testimony of other witnesses, etc.
In State vs. Bleazard, 103 Ut. 113, 113 P.2d 1000
(1943) a manslaughter prosecution resulting from an
automobile accident, this Court states:

"It is not the province of a witness to act as

a judge or jury, and questions calling for his opinion should be so framed as to not call upon him
to determine contraverted question of fact, or to
pass upon the preponderance of the testimony."
Citing Jones, the Law of Evidence, 2d Ed. Pg. 465,
8ec. 372.
Furthermore, the officer who investigated the accident shortly after it occurred, was the witness being
questioned. Certainly, an investigating officer with a
great deial of experience, having observed the facts himself, can properly testify as to his conclusion, based on
those observations.
In EEN vs. Consolidated Freightway, 120 F. Supp.
189, again the Court was considering the testimony of the
investigating officer who himself had seen the physieal
facts immediately following the accident.
In Z elayeta vs. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 104
Cal. App. 2d, 716, 232 P2d 572, the Court quotes from
Manney vs. Housing Authority, 79 Cal. App. 2d 453, 180
P2d 69:
"The two instances in which the opinions of
witnesses are permitted as evidence are:
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L The opm10ns of experts are admitted in
matters which are not within the common experience of men, so that the special knowledge of a
person of skill and experience in the particular
field may enable him to form an opinion, where
men of common experience would not be· able to
do so.
2. The opinions of non-expert witnesses are
admitted as a a matter of practical necessity,
when the matter which they have observed are too
complex or too subtle to enable them accurately
to convey them to Court or a jury in any other
manner."
We point out that the investigating officer, in the
case at bar, Bryant Kent Wheeler, Chief of Police of
Mapleton City, who investigated the accident immediately
after it occurred testified at length conce·rning the skid
marks he observed (T-76), the position of the vehicles
after accident ( T-7 4-75), conversations with the participants, the nature of the highway (T'-79), the road conditions (T-75), and on cross-examination by the Plaintiff's A ttorney, the point of impact (T-79-80) (Exhibit 1).
The point of impact was also brought out on re-direct
examination (T-82-83). His conclusion as to the point of
impact was without objection from Plaintiff's Attorney.
1

In Long vs. State, 274 P.2d 553, the witness was the
officer at the scene.
In Hazelrig Trucking Company vs. Diwall, 261 P2d
204, wherein a witness had been permitted to testify as
to the probable point of impact, even though he had not

6

personally observed the physical facts at the seene, the
Court states :
"The witness testified to matters within the
common knowledge of the average juror .. the
admission of the questioned testimony was cumulative and harmless, if error ... "
0

Furthermore, it is well settled that the Trial Judge
has a wide latitude of discretion in admitting or rejeeting
the proposed opinion testimony.
In Taylor vs. J·ohnson, 18 Ut. 2d 16, 414 P2d 575,
wherein the investigating officer was permitted to state
his opinion of speed based on skid marks, he observed
and measured at the scene, this Court stated:

"It must be conceded that evidence which

amounts to mere guesswork should not be admitted"

* * *

"Whether the officer has sufficient background of learning and experience, and also
whether he takes into account the faictors neeessary to make an estimate of speed of sufficient accuracy that the Trial Court believes that it will
be of assistance to the jury is primarily for the
Trial Court to determine ... The determination
made by the Trial Court should be given some
credit and should not be overturned unless it is
made clearly to appear that he was in error in his
. dgment ... "
JU
2 Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed. 1971 Supp. Pg. 47:
"The rule is that in the discretion of the court
expert testimony may be excluded if all primary
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facts can be accurately and intelligably described
to the jury, and if they, as men of common understanding are as capable of comprehending the
primary facts and of drawing correct conlusions
from them as are the witnesses possessed of s1wcial or peculiar training, experience or observations."
Webb vs. Olin ll;f athicson Chem. Corp., 9 Ut. 2d 275,
342 P.2d 1094, 80 ALR 2d 476.
POINT TWO
APPELLANT'S POINT TWO IS MOOT, INASMUCH
AS THE JURY'S VERDICT ENTITLED DEFENDANT TO THE JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE FOR ACTION.

At T-159 to 162 the jury was polled as to their answers to the first four Special Interrogatories, having to
do with liability.
The jury found that both drivers were negligent,
and that the negligence of both drivers was a proximate
cause of the resulting accident. The jury's verdict was
unammous.
Inasmuch as Plaintiff's husband had sued for property damage in the amount of $299. 71, the Honorable
Trial Court obviously felt that the jury should fix the
amount of property damage in favor of Mr. Beardall,
whose cause of action would not be barred by his wife's
negligence.
Both counsel, in Open Court, and in the presence of
the jury stipulated that the Court could enter Judgment

8

for Mr. Beardall in that amount, inasmuch as the amount
of property damage had been stipulated to.
After counsel had stipula:ted that Plaintiff, Mr.
Beardall, may have Judgment entered in the amount
of the stipulated property damage, for reasons we do
not yet understand, the Honorable Trial Court advised
the jury (T-164) to again retire and answer the Interrogatories having to do with special damages and general damages "without regard to any judgment that may
or may not be entered."
After Defendants excepted to the Court's action in
sending the jury back to the jury room to answer unnecessary questions (T-165-166) the Court stated at T166:
"Now for your information, gentlemen, and
Mr. Midgley particularly, and on the record, one
of my reasons for doing it, should I be reversed
in the Appellate Court, and we have those answers, I won't have to re-try the case."
The jury having found the issues against the Plaintiff, resulting in a Judgment of No Cause for Action in
favor of Defendant, their later determination of the
amount of damages she suffered is moot.
POINT THREE
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
WERE PROPER.

As we '<ligest Appellant's Brief, Point Three, she
9

complains that the Court did not grant Requested Instructions 1, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10, and complains against the
Court's Instructions 7 and 10.
We compare them, in rebuttal.
Requested Instructions shall be referred to as "R"
and the Court's Instructions as "C."
"R"-1 was a request for a directed verdict, which
obviously should have, and was refused.
"R' '-5 contained an improper statement of the law,
in that it states that a finding of failure to sound horn
by the Defendant constituted negligence.

Barton vs. Jensen, 19 Ut. 2d 196, 429 P.2d 44, does
not so state. In that case, this Court stated:
"While there is no general duty upon the
driver to sound his horn before passing other
vehicles, he does have a duty to give an audible
warning of his approach and intention to pass
where it would appear from all the circumstances
that such warning is reasonably necessary to insure safe operation."
The Plaintiff's request improperly stated the law,
and the Court was obviously correct in denying the request.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff in her "R"-7, in which the
negligence of the Defendant in all particulars, was requested, did not include the failure to sound a horn as an
item of negilgence.
10

In "R"-7 having to do with "passing at a safe distance, and not returning to the right side until safely
clear" was completely unnecessary, as not invovling the
facts of this case·.
"R"-8 involving the requirement that a signal be
given for 100 feet was fully and accurately covered by
the Court's Instruction 7,
"R"-9, involving the Right of Way is not even
applicable to the facts of the case at bar. In fact, we
submit that where a motorist is in the process of passing,
where the driver of the car being overtaken has not signalled, in fact has the right of way, and the Requested
Instruction improperly states the law.
"R"-10 wherein the owner of the vehicle is repsonsible for the negligence of the minor, was unnecessary,
and the jury need not be troubled inasmuch as the T'rial
Court, based on the jury verdict, should have handled
the legal effect of the JURY'S VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In "C"-7 the Court, in effect, granted Plaintiff's
"R"-7, but simply altered the request (pointed at the
Defendant) to both drivers. This was eminently more
just. But the rest of the Instruction followed the Plaintiff's request verbatim.
"C"-10 simply advise the jury that they were to
answer Special Interrogatories rather than a General
Verdie:t. The jury was not confused thereby, as they
11

found that both drivers were negligent and that both
was the proximate cause of the accident.
The legal effect of the verdict was then stipulated to,
and the Court erred in demanding that the jury then
re-convene to answer the obvious-that Mr. Beardall was
entitled to a judgment for property damage.
The Court's Instructions were the refore proper.
Respectfully submitted,
L. E. MIDGLEY

Attorney for DefendantRespondent
702 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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